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I f the Korean War of 1950-53 is still often labelled the ‘forgotten war’, 
then what about the Imjin War of 1592-
98? While there are now literally hun-
dreds of works available in Western 
languages on the Korean War, Samuel 
Hawley’s volume is only the second 
devoted solely to the Hideyoshi inva-
sions, and the first to give them their 
full due. Although the war is undoubt-
edly a key event in world history, even 
a basic description of its development 
was until recently unavailable. Previ-
ously, the only facet of the invasions that 
managed to draw the West’s attention 
were the exploits of Admiral Yi Sun-sin 
and his alleged invention of ironclad 
‘turtle ships’.
This is a pity, because the Imjin War 
was a major event in the final stages of 
the traditional East Asian world order 
and in the transition to the modern 
period. The pragmatic, militaristic 
Japanese, spurred on by the megalo-
maniac warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 
clashed with the idealistic Confucian 
bureaucracies of Ming China and 
Chosnn Korea. An international war 
of a kind never seen before, it was 
perhaps the first example of modern 
warfare, with the speed, organisation 
and sheer size of the invading Japanese 
force unrivalled until the modern peri-
od: the more than 150,000 men con-
quered the 450 kilometres from Pusan 
to Seoul in just 20 days.
The war is also important in world his-
tory as a case study of the effects of 
Western missionary, trade and mili-
tary expansion; the muskets that were 
perfected and used to such devastating 
effect by the Japanese had been intro-
duced by the Portuguese in the 1540s, 
while many of the Japanese command-
ers and their troops were Christian con-
verts. A Spanish missionary accompa-
nying Japanese troops sent back to the 
West its first eyewitness accounts of 
Korea, and missionaries or traders also 
introduced plants from the New World, 
such as red pepper and tobacco. Hidey-
oshi’s death in 1598 signalled the final 
retreat of Japanese forces, but his inva-
sions left enduring material and psy-
chological scars on all three countries 
involved. 
‘Fighting with a river 
to one’s back’
Samuel Hawley provides a compre-
hensive, in-depth overview of the war, 
its causes and effects, and the reasons 
for failure and success in battle. Based 
on all available English-language sec-
ondary sources, primary sources and 
a few modern Korean studies, the 
author writes in a lively prose style that 
includes both dramatic re-enactment of 
key scenes and more reflective exposito-
ry passages. The result is an engrossing 
narrative that reads almost like a novel. 
Despite the action-packed plot, Hawley 
avoids reducing actors to stereotypes of 
heroism or cowardice, good or evil, and 
does so without ignoring the tragedy of 
the war.
Although the book offers no new rev-
elations, it accurately reflects current 
knowledge. In this sense it resembles 
Stephen Turnbull’s Samurai Invasions, 
the only other English language book-
length treatment,1 which is superior 
in terms of its lavish illustrations but 
inferior in its detail. Their ordering of 
events is similar, but their assessment 
of key issues differs somewhat. One of 
the most enduring controversies regard-
ing the invasions is whether or not Yi 
Sun-sin’s ‘turtle ships’ were ironclad. 
Hawley argues that they were almost 
certainly not (pages 195-8), while Turn-
bull leaves some room for doubt (pages 
243-4). 
Hawley’s major strength is his insight 
on Korean military tactics. While the 
Chosnn army suffered from the neglect 
and discrimination of Confucian offi-
cials, it drew heavily from Chinese 
military classics, which clearly inspired 
key military decisions. This is clear in 
General Sin Rip’s defence of Ch’ungju. 
Hawley shows that his strategy of ‘fight-
ing with a river to one’s back’ was not 
mere folly but rather based on Chi-
nese military precedent2. By cutting 
off all escape routes for his untrained 
and inexperienced men, he hoped they 
would fight for their lives (pages 154-8). 
While this reliance on Chinese military 
manuals proved disastrous on land, it 
worked very well at sea, where the Japa-
nese had no answer for Yi Sun-sin’s 
superior battle strategies.
Accommodating the lay 
reader to a fault
The author uses secondary sources 
responsibly, but the shortcomings of 
relying mainly on English-language 
sources are obvious, as many date back 
to the very beginning of Western schol-
arship on Korea and Japan. Many prima-
ry sources, meanwhile, demand more 
rigorous criticism, for they may have 
served to paint their authors in a flatter-
ing light, as may have been the case for 
Yu Snng-nyong’s war reflections. Also, 
a few of the author’s generalisations are 
open to question, for example, that the 
Koreans did not need Chinese interven-
tion, or that Koreans were good fighters 
when defending high ramparts and bad 
ones when standing the ground of their 
adversaries.
It is disappointing that the author decid-
ed to apply romanisation standards very 
loosely. All diacritics have been omit-
ted, not only the macrons on Japanese 
vowels and the breves on Korean vow-
els, but also the apostrophes indicating 
aspiration. Thus the city of Ch’nngju 
is rendered as ‘Chongju’ throughout, 
but with many similar place names 
(besides Ch’nngju there is also Chnnju 
and Chnngju), readers unfamiliar with 
Korean geography will be confused. 
Moreover, different romanisation sys-
tems are often mixed, especially the 
McCune-Reischauer system and the 
Revised Romanisation System of Kore-
an; thus we find ‘Kwak Jae-u’ instead 
of Kwak Chae-u (Mc-R) or Gwak Jae-u 
(Revised).
Another annoying feature is the fre-
quent repetition of whole sentences, 
even paragraphs. Undoubtedly, this is 
to refresh the reader’s memory   the 
invasions developed on many fronts, 
and as the narrative moves back and 
forth some repetition is inevitable   but 
the author could at least have made an 
effort to vary his phrasing. Meanwhile, 
while maps are provided to help readers 
trace the main stages of the war, they 
are rather sketchy, and many battle sites 
are not listed. No maps show battle for-
mations at major engagements.
Perhaps these were editorial decisions 
in the interest of making the work more 
accessible to the general reader, but I 
think they are counterproductive, as 
they tend to confuse rather than sim-
plify. On the whole, however, the author 
has succeeded in providing us with a 
much needed reference work which 
gives us all the basic facts about a dev-
astating conflict that is crucial in under-
standing the recent history of northeast 
Asia. What remains to be done, howev-
er, is to move beyond the details of the 
battlefield into the realm of political, 
economic, cultural and social history to 
reveal the larger contours and effects of 
the Imjin War. <
notes
1. Turnbull, Stephen. 2002. Samurai Inva-
sion. Japan’s Korean War 1592-1598. Lon-
don: Cassell.
2.  The expression “Bei shui yi zhan”, literally 
“fighting with the river at your back”, was 
often used to mean “either win or die”. 
This expression came from the battle of 
Jingjingkou, in which the military com-
mander Han Xin deliberately stationed his 
troops facing the enemy, with their backs 
to the river, leaving no escape route. The 
knowledge that there was no way out but 
victory or death inspired the soldiers to 
fight harder. 
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Japanese ‘meglomaniac warlord’ Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi.
A turtle ship replica at the military museum in Seoul.
